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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VIRGIL E. NORTON,

Appellant,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF E.M:PLOYCaseNo.
MENT SECURITY, AND BOARD
11292
OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COl\fMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of
Review of the Industrial Commission which affirmed
a decision of the Appeals Referee denying unemployment benefits to the appellant for the period commencing January 21, 1968, on the ground that he was registered at and attending school.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no dispute as to the facts.
The appellant filed a claim for benefits effective
Ja11uary 21, 1968 (R-15). At that time he was attending
I

Westminster College full-time (R-16) and at the time
of the hearing before the Appeals Referee on April 10,
1968, he was registered at and attending 'Vestminster
(R-17). The tuition fee was $403 a semester (R-17).
During 1967 (his base y€;ar under the Employment
Security Act) he was employed by Trane Company
and was terminated from that employment on January
19, 1968 ( R-15) . During 1967 he earned wages in the '
amount of $5,229.52 (R-16). During that year he
attended Westminster College during the periods J anu·
ary 1 to 27 and September 14 to December 31 (R-16).
While attending school during his base period 1967 he
earned $2,058.25 (R-3) (R-16-17).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW
PROPERLY APPLIED THE PROVISIONS
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT,
CHAPTER 35-4 UCA TO THE FACTS OF THE
CASE.

1

Benefits under the Act are computed on the basis
of an individual's earnings during his base period. Sec· '
tion 35-4-22 (b) defines the "base period" as follows:
"35-4-22 (b) The term 'base period' shall mean
the four completed calendar quarters next pre·
ceding the first day of the individual's benefit
year."
2

The term "benefit year" is defined as follows:
"35-4-22 ( d) ( 1) The term 'benefit year' means
th.e fifty-two consecu~ive week period beginning
with the first week with respect to which an individual files for benefits and is found to have an
insured status."

The appellant's "benefit year" commenced January
21, 1968 (R-15) and his base year became the four quarters of 1967. During 1967, he earned wages in the
amount of $5,229.52 (R-16). While attending school
during his "base period" 1967, he earned wages in the
amount of $2,058.25 (R-03) which did not constitute
the majority of his earnings during his "base period"
so as to escape the statutory disqualification of Section
35-4-5 (g) which provides:
"35-4-5 An individual shall be ineligible for
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting
period:
"(g) for any week in which he is registered at
and attending an established school, or is on vacation during or between successive quarters or
semesters of such school attendance; unless the
major portion of his wages for insured work during his base period was for services performed
while attending school, provided, however, that
notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection
an otherwise eligible individual shall not be ineligible to receive benefits while attending night
school, a part-time training course, or a course
approved by the commission; and provided further that satisfactory attendance and satisfactory progress in a course approved by the commission shall be evidence of availability." (Italics
ours.)
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Under the provisions of Section 5 (g) therefore, the
appellant was disqualified because he was registered at
and attending school during the weeks in 1968 for which
he was claiming benefits. He earned less than the major
portion of. his base period wages while attending school
and there was no basis on which to find that the statutory
disqualification for school attendance was removed. Had
he not worked at all while attending school in 1967, he
of course would also have been ineligible for benefits
while attending school.
If during his benefit year (which commenced J anu- ,
ary 21, 1968) he ceases to attend school he will, if unemployed and able and available for work, be entitled
to benefits upon making application on a week by week
basis.
We agree with Counsel that in 1967 and part of
January, 1968, the appellant worked full time. During
the period for which he is claiming benefits he was unemployed and a full-time student and, as such, ineligible
for benefits under the Act. The applicable provision of
the Act was properly applied to the undisputed facts.
POINT II
SECTION 35-4-5 (g), IS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
OR THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.

4

1

The Utah Employment Security Act 35-4 UCA
provides that certain classes of employers will pay unemployment compensation contributions into a fund
based on the wages paid to certain classes of employments. The Act excludes certain other employments and
employers. It disqualifies individuals who are not able
and available for work and who are not unequivocally
in the labor market and immediately ready to accept
employment. It disqualifies persons on strike, and disqualifies pregnant women for certain weeks before and
after childbirth.
In most respects, its definitions of employers,
covered employments and disqualifications are similar
to those of the several other states of the union. In Utah,
as in most states, the employers alone pay contributions
into the fund. Employees do not pay contributions.
Their rights under the Act are purely statutory.
Prior to 1963, Section 5 ( g) read as follows:
"(g) For any week in which he is attending
an established school, excluding night school,
national defense training course or a course designated by the commission, unless it can be shown
to the satisfaction of the commission that he is
unemployed through no fault of his own and
that he is actively seeking work and will quit
school to accept full-time work during customary
working hours; provided that when the major
portion of his wages for insured work during
his base period was for services performed while
attending school; the foregoing eligibility requirement that he will quit school to accept full-

5

time work during customary working hours shall
not apply; and provided further, that the provi- i
sions of this section shall not be construed as to '
grant benefits to an individual who is not available for substantially full-time work."
In 1963, for reasons not in the record, the Legislature amended Section 5 (g).
Counsel for appellant on page 5 of his brief points
out one probable reason for the amendment. He said,
"It is easy to see that many abuses had arisen prior to
the enactment of this act ... " (meaning the 1963 amendment), "or could have arisen where a student, going to
college on a full-time basis, would work during the sum- ,
mer months to earn enough money to go back to school,
and because of his termination of his employment after
summer employment then be entitled to unemployment
compensation." (Italics ours.)
The Legislature acted within the scope of its authority in denying benefits to persons attending school unless
they met certain requirements.
This Court in Combined Metals Reduction Com·
pany et al v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, IOI
U. 230 116 P.2d 929, said:
"Nor of course is it a mystery that there may
be situations not covered by the act deserving
of help."
The Court then quoted from the case of Carmichael
v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 US 495, 57 S. Ct.
868, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327.

G

1

The Carmichael case is a landmark case dealing
with the rights of State Legislatures to define employers, employments and unemployment benefit entitlements. It was argued before the Court that the state
act in question was unconstitutional because it taxed
some employers and not others; that it covered some
employments and excluded others, and that benefits
were not uniformly provided.
The United States Supreme Court in Carmichael
(Supra) said:
" ( b) Extension of Benefits. The present
scheme of unemployment relief is not subject
to any constitutional infirmity, as respondents
argue, because it is not limited to the indigent
or because it is extended to some less deserving
than others, such as those discharged for misconduct. While we may assume that the state
could have limited its award of unemployment
benefits to the indigent and to those who had not
been rightfully discharged from their employment, it was not bound to do so. Poverty is one
but not the only evil consequence of unemployment. Among the benefits sought by relief is the
avoidance of destitution, and of the gathering
cloud of evils which beset the worker, his family
and the community after wages cease and before
destitution begins.
" ( c) Restriction of Benefits. Appellees again
challenge the tax by attacking as arbitrary the
classification adopted by the legislature for the
distribution of unemployment benefits. Only the
employees of those subject to the tax share in the
benefits. Appellees complain that the relief is
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withheld from many as deserving as those who
receive benefits. The choice of beneficiaries, like
the selection of the subjects of the tax, is thus
said to be f>O arbitrary and discriminatory as to
infringe the Fourteenth Amendment and deprive
the statute of any public purpose.
"What we have said as to the validity of the
choice of the subjects of the tax is applicable
in large measure to the choice of beneficiaries
of the relief. In establishing a system of unemployment benefits the Legislature is not bound
to occupy the whole field. It may strike at the
evil where it is most felt (citing cases) or where
it is most practicable to deal with it, (citing
cases) . It may exclude others whose need is less,
(citing cases) or whose effective aid is attended
by inconvenience which is greater (citing cases)
"As we cannot say that these considerations
did not lead to the selection of the classes of
employees entitled to unemployment benefits,
and as a state of facts may reasonably be conceived which would support the selection, its
constitutionality must be sustained . . ."
In the case of Chamberlin vs. Andrews, 271 N.Y. '
1, 2 NE 2d 22, 106 A.L.R. 1519, the court said:

"It is said that this is taxation for the benefit .
of a special class, not the public at large and thus
the purpose is essentially private. The legislature
after investigation, has found the facts to be
that those who are to receive benefits under the
act are the ones most likely to be out of employ·
ment in times of depression. The courts cannot
investigate these facts and should not attempt
to do so. The briefs submitted show that the clas·
1
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sification or selection made by the legislature has
followed investigation and has sought to reach
the weakest spot. Experience may show this to
be a mistake. No law can act with certainty; it
measures reasonable probabilities.

"Judicial inquiry does not concern itself with
the accuracy of the legislative finding, but only
with' the question whether it so lacks any reasonable basis as to be arbitrary." (citing cases)
(Italics ours.)
In Dominion Hotel, Incorporated v. State of Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"The Fourteenth Amendment is not a pedagogical requirement of the impracticable. The
equal protection of laws does not mean that all
occupations that are called by the same name
must be treated in the same way.
"The only question is whether we can say on
our judicial knowledge that the legislature of
Arizona could not have had any reasonable
ground for believing that there were such public
considerations for the distinction made by the
present law. The deference due the judgment of
the legislature on the matter has been emphasized
again and again."
In the case of Acierno v. General Fireproofing,
144 NE 2d 201 ( 1957) the appellee claimant was attending Youngstown College on a nine-hour schedule.
Ohio law disqualified if he is:
" ... or a student regularly attending an established educational institution during the school
term or customary vacation periods within the
school term."
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Court said:
"We are not confronted here with the proposition of an individual holding a part-time or
full-time job while he is attending an established
educational institution full time. Under such
circumstances, the legislative intent comes
through clearly that such an individual would be
'regularly attending' within the meaning of the
law and, whatever view this court might have
of the legislative policy of such a provision it
would have no power to vary the clear intent of
such policy."
The court then concluded that a student not taking
a full-time course was not "regularly attending."
In Cornell v. Schroeder et al., 114 NE 2d 595,
the claimant for benefits was denied unemployment
compensation benefits while attending school. The
statute disqualified:
" . . . if he is a student regularly attending
an established educational institution during the
school term or customary vacation periods within
the school term."
The court said:
"The referee refused to recognize the appli·
cability of that section to this record, largely on
the ground that the settled policy of a libe~al
construction of the act justified a refusal of disqualification under the section.
"This we find to be error ... Section 1345 - 6
subd. c ( 9) Ohio General Code is very definite
and unambiguous, and though this court can see
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no reason why such a penalty should be attached
to a desire for education, yet as long as the statute
is there the court cannot. judicially amend the
law nor change its meaning when that statute
is susceptible of only one interpretation."
Counsel argues that Section 5 (g) is unconstitutional because it denies benefits to day students and
permits the payment of benefits to those attending night
school. (Brief 7, 8) .
Section 5 (g) does not deny benefits to individuals
attending school in the daytime on a part-time basis or
who are attending courses in the daytime which are approved by the commission.
When the appellant registered at Westminster and
paid his tuition he became a full-time student (R-17).
Even though this Court were inclined to substitute
its judgment for that of the legislature in determining
whether the legislature had a reasonable basis for its
enactment, it could not do so without making an independent investigation.
The record contains no evidence which would enable the court to compare night school students with
day students attending part-time training courses or
day students attending school full time.
Counsel for appellant (Brief, 9) says
"There is no rational basis for singling out an
employee who goes to night school from an employee who goes to day school."
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His contention is not, and cannot be predicated on
the record in this case. We do not have knowledge as
to the rationale of the legislature or the considerations
prompting its action.
The appellant in his appeal to the Appeals Referee
stated the following grounds:
"I agree that, according to the law, I am not ,
eligible to draw benefits while I am in school. .
I do not agree with the law, and I am using this
method to see what I can do about the law."
(R-26)..
Nor was the constitutional issue before the Board
of Review. (See appellant's appeal ( R-13) . )
We do not question the right of counsel to raise the
constitutional issue. This arises out of an administrative
hearing at which counsel had no opportunity to assist
in making a record which would enable this court to
examine his argument that the legislature had no "ra·
tional basis" for the enactment of Section 5 ( g) .
Counsel for Respondent are aware of the facts con·
sidered in the enactment of the section, but are, in the
absence of such facts from the record, precluded from
presenting an argument on those facts. We also will
not make any assumptions.
In light of the Carmichael case (Supra) and
the numerous cases cited therein the court cannot con·
elude that the facts considered by the legislature would
not support its enactment of Section 5 ( g) . It is the
prerogative of the legislature and not the judiciary
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to choose the beneficiaries of the Act. The legislature
is free to decide where the impact of unemployment is
greatest; where it is most practicable to deal with it;
and whether an individual registered at and attending
8chool full time is less entitled to unemployment benefits
than are individuals attending night school, part-time
training courses during nighttime or daytime, or courses
approved by the commission.

SUMMARY
It is respectfully submitted that the law was properly applied to the facts and that the law does not
violate the equal protection guarantees of the Utah and
the United States Constitutions.

Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney General

Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
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